G
Geoffrey F. Green
Hi:
I'm having serious problems reading a particular HTML e-mail message
using Entourage. It's a message that's sent with two parts -- a plain
text part and an HTML part. I'd be happy to read the plain text part.
But Entourage displays the HTML part, and does an awful job rendering
it. Seems to be some sort of character-set problem, in part -- quote
marks and other characters are misrendered. But Entourage doens't
even properly render the links.
IE 5.2.2 renders it fine, as does Safari 1.1 (tested by cutting and
pasting the HTML into a text file and opening it in both browsers).
I've attached a part of the HTML portion of the e-mail, along with the
MIME part -- it's from the Cornell Law School's Supreme Court decision
reporter, liibulletin. Thanks for any help anyone can give. In
particular, I'd be perfectly happy if I could just read the text
portion of this e-mail (with most e-mails, I prefer reading the
rendered version).
- geoff
--MIMEBoundary79bf3dc35cebbe2b6b9df0d769168e32
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<title>Untitled Document</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=iso-8859-1">
</head>
<body>
<hr>
AN E-BULLETIN<br>
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE -- CORNELL LAW SCHOOL<br>
lii\@lii.law.cornell.edu<br>
<hr>
<p>The following decisions have just arrived via the LII's
direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court.
<hr>
<p CLASS="nameplate"><NAMEPLATE>SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES</NAMEPLATE></p>
<h3 CLASS="sylcta">McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.
<i>v.</i> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.</h3>
<h4 class="sylctb">APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA</h4>
<hr WIDTH="20%"> <center>No. 021674.<unicode
value="8195"> Argued September 8, 2003Decided December
10, 2003<footcall num="*"></center> <hr WIDTH="20%">
<!-- SYLLABUS TEXT BEGINS -->
<p CLASS="sylctd">The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), the Communications Act of 1934, and other portions of
the United States Code, is the most recent of nearly a century
of federal enactments designed to purge national politics
of what [is] conceived to be the pernicious influence of
big money campaign contributions. <i>United
States</i> v. <i>Automobile Workers,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?352+567">352 U.S. 567</a>, 572.
In enacting BCRA, Congress sought to address three important
developments in the years since this Courts landmark
decision in <i>Buckley</i> v. <i>Valeo,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?424+1">424 U.S. 1</a> <i>(per
curiam):</i> the increased importance of soft
money, the proliferation of issue ads, and
the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign
practices related to the 1996 federal elections.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
With regard to
the first development, prior to BCRA, FECAs disclosure
requirements and source and amount limitations extended only to
so-called hard money contributions made for the
purpose of influencing an election for federal office.
Political parties and candidates were able to circumvent
FECAs limitations by contributing soft
moneymoney as yet unregulated under FECAto be
used for activities intended to influence state or local
elections; for mixed-purpose activities such as
get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives and generic party advertising;
and for legislative advocacy advertisements, even if they
mentioned a federal candidates name, so long as the ads
did not expressly advocate the candidates election or
defeat. With regard to the second development, parties and
candidates circumvented FECA by using issue ads
that were specifically intended to affect election results, but
did not contain magic words, such as Vote
Against Jane Doe, which would have subjected the ads to
FECAs restrictions. Those developments were detailed in
a 1998 Senate Committee Report summarizing an investigation
into the 1996 federal elections, which concluded that the
soft-money loophole had led to a meltdown of the campaign
finance system; and discussed potential reforms, including a
soft-money ban and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by
nonparty groups.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
Congress
enacted many of the committees proposals in BCRA: Title I
regulates the use of soft money by political parties,
officeholders, and candidates; Title II primarily prohibits
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
communications that are intended to, or have the effect of,
influencing federal election outcomes; and Titles III, IV, and
V set out other requirements. Eleven actions challenging
BCRAs constitutionality were filed. A three-judge
District Court held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and
upheld others. The parties challenging the law are referred to
here as plaintiffs, and those who intervened in support of the
law are intervenor-defendants.</p>
<p CLASS="sylcte"><i>Held</i>: The judgment is affirmed in
part and reversed in part. </p>
<p CLASS="sylctg">251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 251 F. Supp.
2d 948, affirmed in part and reversed in part. </p>
<p CLASS="sylctf"> Justice Stevens and
Justice OConnor delivered the Courts opinion with
respect to BCRA Titles I and II, concluding that the
statutes two principal, complementary
featuresCongress effort to plug the soft-money
loophole and its regulation of electioneering
communicationsmust be upheld in the main. Pp.
23118.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
1. New
FECA §323 survives plaintiffs facial <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>
challenge. Pp. 2377.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
(a) In
evaluating §323, the Court applies the less rigorous
standard of review applicable to campaign contribution limits
under <i>Buckley </i>and its progeny. Such limits are subject
only to closely drawn scrutiny, see 424 U.S., at
25, rather than to strict scrutiny, because, unlike
restrictions on campaign expenditures, contribution limits
entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the
contributors ability to engage in free
communication, <i>e.g., id., </i>at 2021.
Moreover, contribution limits are grounded in the important
governmental interests in preventing both the actual
corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the
eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through
the appearance of corruption. <i>E.g., Federal Election
Commn </i>v. <i>National Right to Work Comm.,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?459+197">459 U.S. 197</a>, 208.
The less rigorous review standard shows proper deference to
Congress ability to weigh competing constitutional
interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise,
and provides it with sufficient room to anticipate and respond
to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to
protect the political process integrity. Finally,
because Congress, in its lengthy deliberations leading to
BCRAs enactment, properly relied on <i>Buckley </i>and
its progeny, <i>stare decisis</i> considerations, buttressed by
the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe one
another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to
the analysis of contribution limits the Court has consistently
followed since <i>Buckley. </i>The Court rejects<i>
</i>plaintiffs argument that the type of speech and
associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally
different from the burdens that accompanied
<i>Buckley</i>s contribution limits. Pp. 2432.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
(b) New
FECA §323(a)which forbids national party committees
and their agents to solicit, receive, direct
, or spend any funds that are not subject to
[FECAs] limitations, prohibitions, and reporting
requirements, 2 U.S.C. A. §§441i(a)(1),
(2)does not violate the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>.
Pp. 3252.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(1) The governmental interest underlying
§323(a)preventing the actual or apparent corruption
of federal candidates and officeholdersconstitutes a
sufficiently important interest to justify contribution limits.
That interest is not limited to the elimination of <i>quid pro
quo,</i> cash-for-votes exchanges, see <i>Buckley, supra</i>,
at 28, but extends also to undue influence on an
officeholders judgment, and the appearance of such
influence, <i>Federal Election Commn</i> v.
<i>Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., </i><a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?533+431">533 U.S. 431</a>, 441
<i>(Colorado II)</i>. These interests are sufficient to
justify not only contribution limits themselves, but also laws
preventing the circumvention of such limits. <i>Id.,</i> at
456. While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments varies
with the novelty or plausibility of the justification raised,
<i>Nixon</i> v. <i>Shrink Missouri Government PAC, </i><a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?528+377">528 U.S. 377</a>, 391,
the idea that large contributions to a national party can
corrupt or create the appearance of corruption of federal
candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible,
see, <i>e.g., Buckley</i>, <i>supra,</i> at 38. There is
substantial evidence in these cases to support Congress
determination that such contributions of soft money give rise
to corruption and the appearance of corruption. For instance,
the record is replete with examples of national party
committees peddling access to federal candidates and
officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp.
3245.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(2) Section §323(a) is not impermissibly
overbroad because it subjects <i>all</i> funds raised and spent
by national parties to FECAs hard-money source and amount
limits, including, <i>e.g.,</i> funds spent on purely state and
local elections in which no federal office is at stake. The
record demonstrates that the close relationship between federal
officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by
which parties have traded on that relationship, have made all
large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect,
regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. The
Governments strong interests in preventing corruption,
and particularly its appearance, are thus sufficient to justify
subjecting all donations to national parties to FECAs
source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp.
4547.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(3) Nor is §323(a)s prohibition on
national parties soliciting or directing soft-money
contributions substantially overbroad. That prohibitions
reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-money solicitations
by national party committees and party officers acting in their
official capacities; the committees themselves remain free to
solicit hard money on their own behalf or that of state
committees and state and local candidates and to contribute
hard money to state committees and candidates. Plaintiffs
argue unpersuasively that the solicitation bans
overbreadth is demonstrated by §323(e), which allows
federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts
of soft money from individual donors under certain
circumstances. The differences between §§323(a) and
323(e) are without constitutional significance, see <i>National
Right to Work</i>, 459 U.S., at 210, reflecting Congress
reasonable and expert judgments about national committees
functions and their interactions with officeholders. Pp.
4748.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(4) Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad
with respect to the speech and associational rights of minor
parties, even though the latter may have slim prospects for
electoral success. It is reasonable to require that all
parties and candidates follow the same rules designed to
protect the electoral processs integrity. <i>Buckley,
</i>424 U.S., at 3435. A nascent or struggling minor
party can bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a)
prevents it from amassing the resources necessary to engage in
effective advocacy. <i>Id.,</i> at 21. Pp. 4851.</p
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(5) Plaintiffs argument that §323(a)
unconstitutionally interferes with the ability of national
committees to associate with state and local committees is
unpersuasive because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading
of the statutory terms spend, receive,
direct, and solicit. Nothing on
§323(a)s face prohibits national party officers from
sitting down with state and local party committees or
candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft
money, so long as the national officers do not personally
spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money. Pp.
5152.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
(c) The
Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the so-called
millionaire provisions, BCRA §§304, 315,
and 316, which provide for a series of staggered increases in
otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the
candidates opponent spends a triggering amount of his
personal funds, and eliminate the coordinated expenditure
limits in certain circumstances. Because these plaintiffs
allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA
§307, they fail to state a cognizable injury that is
fairly traceable to BCRA. Additionally, none of them is a
candidate in an election affected by the millionaire
provisions, and it would be purely conjectural to assume that
any of them ever will be. P. 8.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
2. The
District Courts decision upholding BCRA §311s
expansion of FECA §318(a) to include mandatory
electioneering-communications-disbursements disclosure is
affirmed because such inclusion bears a sufficient relationship
to the important governmental interest of shed[ding] the
light of publicity on campaign financing, <i>Buckley,</i>
424 U.S., at 81<i>. </i>Assuming, as the Court must, that FECA
§318 is valid both to begin with and as amended by BCRA
§311s amendments other than the
electioneering-communications inclusion, the latter inclusion
is not itself unconstitutional. P. 9.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
3. BCRA
§318which forbids individuals 17 years old or
younger to make contributions to candidates and political
parties, 2 U.S.C. A. §441kviolates the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>
rights of minors, see, <i>e.g</i>., <i>Tinker</i> v. <i>Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist.,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?393+503">393 U.S. 503</a>,
511513. Because limitations on an individuals
political contributions impinge on the freedoms of expression
and association, see <i>Buckley, </i>424 U.S., at 2022,
the Court applies heightened scrutiny to such a limitation,
asking whether it is justified by a sufficiently
important interest and closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment of the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>, see
<i>e.g.,</i> <i>post,</i> at 2526 (joint opinion of
Stevens and OConnor, JJ.). The Government offers scant
evidence for its assertion that §318 protects against
corruption by conduit<i>i.e.,</i> donations by parents
through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits
applicable to the parents. Absent a more convincing case of
the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for
§318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See <i>Shrink
Missouri</i>, 528 U.S., at 391. Even assuming,
<i>arguendo</i>, the Government advances an important interest,
the provision is overinclusive, as shown by the States
adoption of more tailored approaches. Pp. 911.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
4. Because
the FEC clearly has standing, the Court need not address
whether the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is
identical to the FECs, were properly granted intervention
pursuant to, <i>inter alia</i>, BCRA §403(b). See,
<i>e.g.,</i> <i>Clinton</i> v. <i>City of New York, </i><a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?524+417">524 U.S. 417</a>,
431432, n. 19. P. 11.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
Justice Breyer
delivered the Courts opinion with respect to BCRA Title
V§504 of which amends the Communications Act of 1934
to require broadcasters to keep publicly available records of
politically related broadcasting requests, 47 U.S.C. A.
§315(e)concluding that the portion of the judgment
below invalidating §504 as facially violative of the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a> must
be reversed. Pp. 215.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
1. Section
504s candidate request
requirementswhich call for broadcasters to keep records
of broadcast requests made by or on behalf of any
candidate, 47 U.S.C. A. §315(e)(1)(A)are
upheld. They are virtually identical to those contained in a
longstanding FCC regulation. The McConnell plaintiffs
argument that the requirements are intolerably burdensome and
invasive is rejected. The FCC has consistently estimated that
its regulation imposes upon a licensee a comparatively small
additional administrative burden. Moreover, the §504
requirement is supported by significant governmental interests
in verifying that licensees comply with their obligations to
allow political candidates equal time, <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-usc-cite/47/315">47 U.S.C. §
315</a>(a), and to sell such time at the lowest unit
charge, §315(b); in evaluating whether they are
processing candidate requests in an evenhanded fashion to help
assure broadcasting fairness, §315(a); in making the
public aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast
messages; 2 U.S.C. A. §434; and in providing an
independently compiled set of data for verifying
candidates compliance with BCRAs and FECAs
disclosure requirements and source limitations, <i>ibid.</i>
Because the Court cannot, on the present record, find the
longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike
down BCRA §504s candidate request
provision, which simply embodies the regulation in a statute,
thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it.
Pp. 37.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
2. Because
§504s candidate request requirements are
constitutional, its election message
requirementswhich serve similar governmental interests
and impose only a small incremental burden in requiring
broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to
broadcast message that refer either to a
legally qualified candidate or to any
election to Federal office, 47 U.S.C. A.
§§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)must be constitutional
as well. Pp. 89.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
3. BCRA
§504s issue request
requirementswhich call for broadcasters to keep records
of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast
message related to a national legislative
issue of public importance, 47 U.S.C. A.
§315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a political matter of
national importance, §315(e)(1)(B)survive the
McConnell plaintiffs facial challenge. These
recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help determine
whether broadcasters are fulfilling their obligations under the
FCCs regulations to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on important public issues or
whether they too heavily favor entertainment, discriminating
against public affairs broadcasts. The plaintiffs claim
that the above-quoted statutory language is unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad is unpersuasive, given that it is no more
general than language Congress has used to impose other
obligations upon broadcasters and is roughly comparable to
other BCRA language upheld in this litigation. Whether the
issue request requirements impose disproportionate
administrative burdens will depend on how the FCC interprets
and applies them. The parties remain free to challenge the
provisions, as interpreted by the FCCs regulations, or as
otherwise applied. Without the greater information any such
challenge will likely provide, the Court cannot say that the
provisions administrative burdens are so great, or their
justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding them facially
unconstitutional. Similarly, the argument that the issue
request requirement will force the purchasers to disclose
information revealing their political strategies to opponents
does not show that BCRA §504 is facially unconstitutional,
but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when
§504 is applied. Pp. 912.</p>
<p CLASS="sylcth"> Stevens and
OConnor, JJ., delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in
which OConnor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined,
in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined except with
respect to BCRA §305, and in which Thomas, J., joined with
respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and
403(b). Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to BCRA Title V, in which Stevens, OConnor,
Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an
opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV,
dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to
BCRA Title II. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring with
respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA
§§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect
to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II, and
dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and §311, in
which opinion Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, IIA, and
IIB. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA
Titles I and II, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, in
which Scalia, J., joined except to the extent the opinion
upholds new FECA §323(e) and BCRA §202, and in which
Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA §213. Rehnquist,
C. J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA
Titles I and V, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA
§305, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined.</p>
<hr><h2 CLASS="fnheader">Notes</h2>
<p CLASS="footnote"><a CLASS="fnflag" HREF="#FN*SRC"
NAME="FN*">*.</a> Together with No. 021675,
<i>National Rifle Association et al.</i> v. <i>Federal Election
Commission et al.,</i> No. 021676, <i> Federal Election
Commission et al.</i> v. <i>McConnell, United States Senator,
et al.,</i> No. 021702, <i>McCain, United States Senator,
et al.</i> v. <i>McConnell, United States Senator, et al.</i>,
No. 021727, <i>Republican National Committee et al.</i>
v. <i>Federal Election Commission et al., </i>No. 021733,
<i>National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al.</i> v.
<i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> No. 021734,
<i>American Civil Liberties Union</i> v. <i>Federal Election
Commission et al., </i>No. 021740, <i> Adams et al.</i>
v. <i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> No. 021747,
<i>Paul, United States Congressman, et al.</i> v. <i>Federal
Election Commission et al., </i>No. 021753, <i>California
Democratic Party et al.</i> v. <i>Federal Election Commission
et al.,</i> No. 021755, <i>American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.</i> v.
<i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> and No.
021756, <i>Chamber of Commerce of the United States et
al.</i> v. <i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> also on
appeal from the same court.
<hr>
<p> These and all other recent Supreme Court decisions are
archived in full text at <a href="http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/">http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/</a>(in hypertext versions
prepared by the LII and the original PDF
files received from the Court)</p>
<p>You are currently subscribed to liibulletin as:
(e-mail address removed) To unsubscribe send a blank email to
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>. Alternatively, you can visit
<a href="http://liibulletin.law.cornell.edu">http://liibulletin.law.cornell.edu</a> to end or alter your
subscription or to share this resource with others.</p>
<hr>
<p> </p>
</HTML>
--MIMEBoundary79bf3dc35cebbe2b6b9df0d769168e32--
I'm having serious problems reading a particular HTML e-mail message
using Entourage. It's a message that's sent with two parts -- a plain
text part and an HTML part. I'd be happy to read the plain text part.
But Entourage displays the HTML part, and does an awful job rendering
it. Seems to be some sort of character-set problem, in part -- quote
marks and other characters are misrendered. But Entourage doens't
even properly render the links.
IE 5.2.2 renders it fine, as does Safari 1.1 (tested by cutting and
pasting the HTML into a text file and opening it in both browsers).
I've attached a part of the HTML portion of the e-mail, along with the
MIME part -- it's from the Cornell Law School's Supreme Court decision
reporter, liibulletin. Thanks for any help anyone can give. In
particular, I'd be perfectly happy if I could just read the text
portion of this e-mail (with most e-mails, I prefer reading the
rendered version).
- geoff
--MIMEBoundary79bf3dc35cebbe2b6b9df0d769168e32
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<title>Untitled Document</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=iso-8859-1">
</head>
<body>
<hr>
AN E-BULLETIN<br>
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE -- CORNELL LAW SCHOOL<br>
lii\@lii.law.cornell.edu<br>
<hr>
<p>The following decisions have just arrived via the LII's
direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court.
<hr>
<p CLASS="nameplate"><NAMEPLATE>SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES</NAMEPLATE></p>
<h3 CLASS="sylcta">McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.
<i>v.</i> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.</h3>
<h4 class="sylctb">APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA</h4>
<hr WIDTH="20%"> <center>No. 021674.<unicode
value="8195"> Argued September 8, 2003Decided December
10, 2003<footcall num="*"></center> <hr WIDTH="20%">
<!-- SYLLABUS TEXT BEGINS -->
<p CLASS="sylctd">The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), the Communications Act of 1934, and other portions of
the United States Code, is the most recent of nearly a century
of federal enactments designed to purge national politics
of what [is] conceived to be the pernicious influence of
big money campaign contributions. <i>United
States</i> v. <i>Automobile Workers,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?352+567">352 U.S. 567</a>, 572.
In enacting BCRA, Congress sought to address three important
developments in the years since this Courts landmark
decision in <i>Buckley</i> v. <i>Valeo,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?424+1">424 U.S. 1</a> <i>(per
curiam):</i> the increased importance of soft
money, the proliferation of issue ads, and
the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign
practices related to the 1996 federal elections.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
With regard to
the first development, prior to BCRA, FECAs disclosure
requirements and source and amount limitations extended only to
so-called hard money contributions made for the
purpose of influencing an election for federal office.
Political parties and candidates were able to circumvent
FECAs limitations by contributing soft
moneymoney as yet unregulated under FECAto be
used for activities intended to influence state or local
elections; for mixed-purpose activities such as
get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives and generic party advertising;
and for legislative advocacy advertisements, even if they
mentioned a federal candidates name, so long as the ads
did not expressly advocate the candidates election or
defeat. With regard to the second development, parties and
candidates circumvented FECA by using issue ads
that were specifically intended to affect election results, but
did not contain magic words, such as Vote
Against Jane Doe, which would have subjected the ads to
FECAs restrictions. Those developments were detailed in
a 1998 Senate Committee Report summarizing an investigation
into the 1996 federal elections, which concluded that the
soft-money loophole had led to a meltdown of the campaign
finance system; and discussed potential reforms, including a
soft-money ban and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by
nonparty groups.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
Congress
enacted many of the committees proposals in BCRA: Title I
regulates the use of soft money by political parties,
officeholders, and candidates; Title II primarily prohibits
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
communications that are intended to, or have the effect of,
influencing federal election outcomes; and Titles III, IV, and
V set out other requirements. Eleven actions challenging
BCRAs constitutionality were filed. A three-judge
District Court held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and
upheld others. The parties challenging the law are referred to
here as plaintiffs, and those who intervened in support of the
law are intervenor-defendants.</p>
<p CLASS="sylcte"><i>Held</i>: The judgment is affirmed in
part and reversed in part. </p>
<p CLASS="sylctg">251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 251 F. Supp.
2d 948, affirmed in part and reversed in part. </p>
<p CLASS="sylctf"> Justice Stevens and
Justice OConnor delivered the Courts opinion with
respect to BCRA Titles I and II, concluding that the
statutes two principal, complementary
featuresCongress effort to plug the soft-money
loophole and its regulation of electioneering
communicationsmust be upheld in the main. Pp.
23118.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
1. New
FECA §323 survives plaintiffs facial <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>
challenge. Pp. 2377.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
(a) In
evaluating §323, the Court applies the less rigorous
standard of review applicable to campaign contribution limits
under <i>Buckley </i>and its progeny. Such limits are subject
only to closely drawn scrutiny, see 424 U.S., at
25, rather than to strict scrutiny, because, unlike
restrictions on campaign expenditures, contribution limits
entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the
contributors ability to engage in free
communication, <i>e.g., id., </i>at 2021.
Moreover, contribution limits are grounded in the important
governmental interests in preventing both the actual
corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the
eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through
the appearance of corruption. <i>E.g., Federal Election
Commn </i>v. <i>National Right to Work Comm.,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?459+197">459 U.S. 197</a>, 208.
The less rigorous review standard shows proper deference to
Congress ability to weigh competing constitutional
interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise,
and provides it with sufficient room to anticipate and respond
to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to
protect the political process integrity. Finally,
because Congress, in its lengthy deliberations leading to
BCRAs enactment, properly relied on <i>Buckley </i>and
its progeny, <i>stare decisis</i> considerations, buttressed by
the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe one
another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to
the analysis of contribution limits the Court has consistently
followed since <i>Buckley. </i>The Court rejects<i>
</i>plaintiffs argument that the type of speech and
associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally
different from the burdens that accompanied
<i>Buckley</i>s contribution limits. Pp. 2432.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
(b) New
FECA §323(a)which forbids national party committees
and their agents to solicit, receive, direct
, or spend any funds that are not subject to
[FECAs] limitations, prohibitions, and reporting
requirements, 2 U.S.C. A. §§441i(a)(1),
(2)does not violate the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>.
Pp. 3252.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(1) The governmental interest underlying
§323(a)preventing the actual or apparent corruption
of federal candidates and officeholdersconstitutes a
sufficiently important interest to justify contribution limits.
That interest is not limited to the elimination of <i>quid pro
quo,</i> cash-for-votes exchanges, see <i>Buckley, supra</i>,
at 28, but extends also to undue influence on an
officeholders judgment, and the appearance of such
influence, <i>Federal Election Commn</i> v.
<i>Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., </i><a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?533+431">533 U.S. 431</a>, 441
<i>(Colorado II)</i>. These interests are sufficient to
justify not only contribution limits themselves, but also laws
preventing the circumvention of such limits. <i>Id.,</i> at
456. While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments varies
with the novelty or plausibility of the justification raised,
<i>Nixon</i> v. <i>Shrink Missouri Government PAC, </i><a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?528+377">528 U.S. 377</a>, 391,
the idea that large contributions to a national party can
corrupt or create the appearance of corruption of federal
candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible,
see, <i>e.g., Buckley</i>, <i>supra,</i> at 38. There is
substantial evidence in these cases to support Congress
determination that such contributions of soft money give rise
to corruption and the appearance of corruption. For instance,
the record is replete with examples of national party
committees peddling access to federal candidates and
officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp.
3245.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(2) Section §323(a) is not impermissibly
overbroad because it subjects <i>all</i> funds raised and spent
by national parties to FECAs hard-money source and amount
limits, including, <i>e.g.,</i> funds spent on purely state and
local elections in which no federal office is at stake. The
record demonstrates that the close relationship between federal
officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by
which parties have traded on that relationship, have made all
large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect,
regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. The
Governments strong interests in preventing corruption,
and particularly its appearance, are thus sufficient to justify
subjecting all donations to national parties to FECAs
source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp.
4547.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(3) Nor is §323(a)s prohibition on
national parties soliciting or directing soft-money
contributions substantially overbroad. That prohibitions
reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-money solicitations
by national party committees and party officers acting in their
official capacities; the committees themselves remain free to
solicit hard money on their own behalf or that of state
committees and state and local candidates and to contribute
hard money to state committees and candidates. Plaintiffs
argue unpersuasively that the solicitation bans
overbreadth is demonstrated by §323(e), which allows
federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts
of soft money from individual donors under certain
circumstances. The differences between §§323(a) and
323(e) are without constitutional significance, see <i>National
Right to Work</i>, 459 U.S., at 210, reflecting Congress
reasonable and expert judgments about national committees
functions and their interactions with officeholders. Pp.
4748.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(4) Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad
with respect to the speech and associational rights of minor
parties, even though the latter may have slim prospects for
electoral success. It is reasonable to require that all
parties and candidates follow the same rules designed to
protect the electoral processs integrity. <i>Buckley,
</i>424 U.S., at 3435. A nascent or struggling minor
party can bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a)
prevents it from amassing the resources necessary to engage in
effective advocacy. <i>Id.,</i> at 21. Pp. 4851.</p
<p CLASS="bodytext">
 
;(5) Plaintiffs argument that §323(a)
unconstitutionally interferes with the ability of national
committees to associate with state and local committees is
unpersuasive because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading
of the statutory terms spend, receive,
direct, and solicit. Nothing on
§323(a)s face prohibits national party officers from
sitting down with state and local party committees or
candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft
money, so long as the national officers do not personally
spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money. Pp.
5152.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
(c) The
Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the so-called
millionaire provisions, BCRA §§304, 315,
and 316, which provide for a series of staggered increases in
otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the
candidates opponent spends a triggering amount of his
personal funds, and eliminate the coordinated expenditure
limits in certain circumstances. Because these plaintiffs
allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA
§307, they fail to state a cognizable injury that is
fairly traceable to BCRA. Additionally, none of them is a
candidate in an election affected by the millionaire
provisions, and it would be purely conjectural to assume that
any of them ever will be. P. 8.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
2. The
District Courts decision upholding BCRA §311s
expansion of FECA §318(a) to include mandatory
electioneering-communications-disbursements disclosure is
affirmed because such inclusion bears a sufficient relationship
to the important governmental interest of shed[ding] the
light of publicity on campaign financing, <i>Buckley,</i>
424 U.S., at 81<i>. </i>Assuming, as the Court must, that FECA
§318 is valid both to begin with and as amended by BCRA
§311s amendments other than the
electioneering-communications inclusion, the latter inclusion
is not itself unconstitutional. P. 9.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
3. BCRA
§318which forbids individuals 17 years old or
younger to make contributions to candidates and political
parties, 2 U.S.C. A. §441kviolates the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>
rights of minors, see, <i>e.g</i>., <i>Tinker</i> v. <i>Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist.,</i> <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?393+503">393 U.S. 503</a>,
511513. Because limitations on an individuals
political contributions impinge on the freedoms of expression
and association, see <i>Buckley, </i>424 U.S., at 2022,
the Court applies heightened scrutiny to such a limitation,
asking whether it is justified by a sufficiently
important interest and closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment of the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a>, see
<i>e.g.,</i> <i>post,</i> at 2526 (joint opinion of
Stevens and OConnor, JJ.). The Government offers scant
evidence for its assertion that §318 protects against
corruption by conduit<i>i.e.,</i> donations by parents
through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits
applicable to the parents. Absent a more convincing case of
the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for
§318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See <i>Shrink
Missouri</i>, 528 U.S., at 391. Even assuming,
<i>arguendo</i>, the Government advances an important interest,
the provision is overinclusive, as shown by the States
adoption of more tailored approaches. Pp. 911.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
4. Because
the FEC clearly has standing, the Court need not address
whether the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is
identical to the FECs, were properly granted intervention
pursuant to, <i>inter alia</i>, BCRA §403(b). See,
<i>e.g.,</i> <i>Clinton</i> v. <i>City of New York, </i><a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?524+417">524 U.S. 417</a>,
431432, n. 19. P. 11.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
Justice Breyer
delivered the Courts opinion with respect to BCRA Title
V§504 of which amends the Communications Act of 1934
to require broadcasters to keep publicly available records of
politically related broadcasting requests, 47 U.S.C. A.
§315(e)concluding that the portion of the judgment
below invalidating §504 as facially violative of the <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti">First Amendment</a> must
be reversed. Pp. 215.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
1. Section
504s candidate request
requirementswhich call for broadcasters to keep records
of broadcast requests made by or on behalf of any
candidate, 47 U.S.C. A. §315(e)(1)(A)are
upheld. They are virtually identical to those contained in a
longstanding FCC regulation. The McConnell plaintiffs
argument that the requirements are intolerably burdensome and
invasive is rejected. The FCC has consistently estimated that
its regulation imposes upon a licensee a comparatively small
additional administrative burden. Moreover, the §504
requirement is supported by significant governmental interests
in verifying that licensees comply with their obligations to
allow political candidates equal time, <a
HREF="/supct-cgi/get-usc-cite/47/315">47 U.S.C. §
315</a>(a), and to sell such time at the lowest unit
charge, §315(b); in evaluating whether they are
processing candidate requests in an evenhanded fashion to help
assure broadcasting fairness, §315(a); in making the
public aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast
messages; 2 U.S.C. A. §434; and in providing an
independently compiled set of data for verifying
candidates compliance with BCRAs and FECAs
disclosure requirements and source limitations, <i>ibid.</i>
Because the Court cannot, on the present record, find the
longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike
down BCRA §504s candidate request
provision, which simply embodies the regulation in a statute,
thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it.
Pp. 37.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
2. Because
§504s candidate request requirements are
constitutional, its election message
requirementswhich serve similar governmental interests
and impose only a small incremental burden in requiring
broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to
broadcast message
legally qualified candidate or to any
election to Federal office, 47 U.S.C. A.
§§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)must be constitutional
as well. Pp. 89.</p>
<p CLASS="bodytext">
3. BCRA
§504s issue request
requirementswhich call for broadcasters to keep records
of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast
message
issue of public importance, 47 U.S.C. A.
§315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a political matter of
national importance, §315(e)(1)(B)survive the
McConnell plaintiffs facial challenge. These
recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help determine
whether broadcasters are fulfilling their obligations under the
FCCs regulations to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on important public issues or
whether they too heavily favor entertainment, discriminating
against public affairs broadcasts. The plaintiffs claim
that the above-quoted statutory language is unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad is unpersuasive, given that it is no more
general than language Congress has used to impose other
obligations upon broadcasters and is roughly comparable to
other BCRA language upheld in this litigation. Whether the
issue request requirements impose disproportionate
administrative burdens will depend on how the FCC interprets
and applies them. The parties remain free to challenge the
provisions, as interpreted by the FCCs regulations, or as
otherwise applied. Without the greater information any such
challenge will likely provide, the Court cannot say that the
provisions administrative burdens are so great, or their
justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding them facially
unconstitutional. Similarly, the argument that the issue
request requirement will force the purchasers to disclose
information revealing their political strategies to opponents
does not show that BCRA §504 is facially unconstitutional,
but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when
§504 is applied. Pp. 912.</p>
<p CLASS="sylcth"> Stevens and
OConnor, JJ., delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in
which OConnor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined,
in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined except with
respect to BCRA §305, and in which Thomas, J., joined with
respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and
403(b). Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to BCRA Title V, in which Stevens, OConnor,
Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an
opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV,
dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to
BCRA Title II. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring with
respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA
§§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect
to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II, and
dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and §311, in
which opinion Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, IIA, and
IIB. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA
Titles I and II, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, in
which Scalia, J., joined except to the extent the opinion
upholds new FECA §323(e) and BCRA §202, and in which
Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA §213. Rehnquist,
C. J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA
Titles I and V, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA
§305, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined.</p>
<hr><h2 CLASS="fnheader">Notes</h2>
<p CLASS="footnote"><a CLASS="fnflag" HREF="#FN*SRC"
NAME="FN*">*.</a> Together with No. 021675,
<i>National Rifle Association et al.</i> v. <i>Federal Election
Commission et al.,</i> No. 021676, <i> Federal Election
Commission et al.</i> v. <i>McConnell, United States Senator,
et al.,</i> No. 021702, <i>McCain, United States Senator,
et al.</i> v. <i>McConnell, United States Senator, et al.</i>,
No. 021727, <i>Republican National Committee et al.</i>
v. <i>Federal Election Commission et al., </i>No. 021733,
<i>National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al.</i> v.
<i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> No. 021734,
<i>American Civil Liberties Union</i> v. <i>Federal Election
Commission et al., </i>No. 021740, <i> Adams et al.</i>
v. <i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> No. 021747,
<i>Paul, United States Congressman, et al.</i> v. <i>Federal
Election Commission et al., </i>No. 021753, <i>California
Democratic Party et al.</i> v. <i>Federal Election Commission
et al.,</i> No. 021755, <i>American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.</i> v.
<i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> and No.
021756, <i>Chamber of Commerce of the United States et
al.</i> v. <i>Federal Election Commission et al.,</i> also on
appeal from the same court.
<hr>
<p> These and all other recent Supreme Court decisions are
archived in full text at <a href="http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/">http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/</a>(in hypertext versions
prepared by the LII and the original PDF
files received from the Court)</p>
<p>You are currently subscribed to liibulletin as:
(e-mail address removed) To unsubscribe send a blank email to
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>. Alternatively, you can visit
<a href="http://liibulletin.law.cornell.edu">http://liibulletin.law.cornell.edu</a> to end or alter your
subscription or to share this resource with others.</p>
<hr>
<p> </p>
</HTML>
--MIMEBoundary79bf3dc35cebbe2b6b9df0d769168e32--